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Duty drawback schemes, which typically involve a combination of duty rebates and 
exemptions, are a feature of many countries’ trade regimes. They are used in highly protected 
developing economies as means of providing exporters with imported inputs at world prices, 
thus increasing their competitiveness, while maintaining the protection on the rest of the 
economy. In China, duty exemptions have been central to the process of trade reform and have 
led to a tremendous increase in processed exports utilizing imported materials. Despite the 
widespread use and importance of duty drawbacks, these “new trade liberalization” instruments 
have been given relatively little attention in empirical multilateral trade liberalization studies. 
This paper presents an empirical multi-region general equilibrium model, in which the effects 
of policy reform are differentiated based on the trade orientation of the firms. The model is 
useful for analyzing trade liberalization in the presence of duty drawbacks, assessing whether 
countries should introduce or abolish these types of arrangements, and evaluating the impact of 
improved duty drawback system administration. The analysis shows that failure to account for 
duty exemptions in the case of China’s recent WTO accession will overstate the increase in 
China’s trade flows by 40 percent, welfare by 15 percent, and exports of selected sectors by as 
much as 90 percent. The magnitude of the bias depends on the level of pre-intervention tariffs 
and the size of tariff cuts – the larger the initial distortions and tariff reductions, the larger the 
bias when duty drawbacks are ignored. The bias in the estimates of China’s real GDP, trade 
flows and welfare changes due to WTO accession increases more than three times when 
China’s pre-intervention tariffs are raised from their 1997 levels to the much higher 1995 
levels. These results suggest that trade liberalization studies, focusing on economies in which 
protection is high, import concessions play an important role and planned tariff cuts are deep, 
must treat duty drawbacks explicitly in order to avoid serious errors in their estimates of 
sectoral output, trade flows and welfare changes. 
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Trade Policy Analysis in the Presence of Duty Drawbacks 
1. Introduction 
Duty drawback schemes, which typically involve a combination of duty rebates and 
exemptions, are a feature of many countries’ trade regimes. They are used in highly protected 
developing economies as means of providing exporters with imported inputs at world prices, 
and thus increasing their competitiveness, while maintaining the protection on the rest of the 
economy. Duty drawback programs have been used with varied degrees of success. While in 
many countries duty drawbacks have not been implemented successfully, largely due to 
administrative weaknesses, in others these schemes have been very effective in opening up 
export-oriented sectors by overriding existing protection. In China, duty exemptions at the point 
of entry have been an essential part of the country’s export processing system and trade reform 
process.  
The legal framework for China’s export processing (EP) system was introduced in 
1979 in order to overcome the anti-export bias created by state-managed exchange rate and 
pricing policies. In the pre-reform era, exchange rates, indirect trade policy instruments such as 
tariffs, and relative prices had little influence on the magnitude and commodity composition of 
China’s foreign trade. Firms producing for export sold their products to foreign trade 
companies at officially established domestic prices, fixed in domestic currency. Export 
producers did not get the foreign exchange income from the sale of their products on 
international markets, and thus had little incentive to expand production of goods for which 
foreign demand was strong (Lardy 2002). The prices of imports also distorted the distribution 
of resources in the economy. Approximately 80 percent of imports were sold in China at prices 
similar to those of comparable products, quoted in domestic currency, and adjusted up or down    4
to reflect quality differences. This price setting process isolated domestic firms from the 
influence of relative domestic and international price and exchange rate changes. For imports 
without domestic equivalents, which accounted for 20 percent of all imports, domestic prices 
were based on the cost of imports converted to domestic currency at the official exchange rate. 
Since this exchange rate was overvalued, the imports were in effect subsidized. The 
consequences of these policies were lagging exports, low growth in trade volume, and a 
distorted commodity composition of foreign trade, which did not correspond to China’s 
comparative advantage in the production of labor intensive goods.  
The EP system helped remedy these problems. Initially the system provided various 
incentives for both the processing of raw materials for export and the assembly of imported 
parts and components to produce finished goods for export (known as processing and 
assembling or processing with supplied materials). As tariffs became very important in the 
1980s, these incentives were expanded in 1987 to allow for duty-free imports of all raw 
materials and intermediate inputs used in the production of exports. These duty exemptions 
contributed strongly to China’s actual collection rate being only one-sixth of its weighted 
average tariff rate (World Bank 1994)
1 and led to a tremendous increase in processed exports 
utilizing imported materials in China. In the span of just three years, processed exports 
produced with inputs purchased from abroad almost tripled, increasing from US$140 million in 
1988 to US$324 million in 1991, while total exports rose by 50 percent (World Bank 1994). In 
2000, EP trade in China accounted for 50 percent of total trade, with EP accounting for 55 
percent of total exports. The share of concessional imports in total imports rose from one-third 
to around one-half between 1988 and 1991 and has remained around this level since then.  
                                                 
1 Concessional imports cannot alone explain the low collection rates. A collection rate of 5.6 percent represents only 
17.5 percent of the trade weighted average tariff of 32 percent for 1991 (World Bank 1994). Other imports by the 
government such as imports used for priority projects were also exempt. It is also possible that there were other 
leakages in the revenue collection system.      5
Duty exemptions increase the economy’s competitiveness and efficiency. In the 
absence of duty drawbacks the protection of import competing firms is in general positive, 
while that of export competing firms is negative (Figure 1).
2 This is because export competing 
firms face world prices while domestic competing firms are protected by tariffs on final goods. 
Duty drawbacks reduce the Effective Rates of Protection (ERPs) for export competing firms to 
0,
3 which allows export producers to operate at world prices, and halve the standard deviation 
in ERPs, which in turn increases the efficiency of the economy.  
Despite the presence and vast importance of duty drawbacks in China and other 
developing countries, these “new trade liberalization” instruments have been given relatively 
little attention both in trade negotiations and in empirical multilateral trade liberalization 
studies. A paper by Panagariya (1992) provides a systematic analysis of the effects of 
input tariffs and duty drawbacks on welfare, but standard global trade models (Hertel 
1997) have abstracted from the presence of concessional imports, while trade liberalization 
studies using these models have at best offered only partial solutions to the problem (Bach, 
Martin and Stevens 1997). Recently, the topic of concessional import arrangements has been 
considered in papers by Gruen (1999), Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga (2003), and Fan and Li 
(2000). Gruen (1999) illustrates the similarities and differences between traditional and “new 
trade liberalization” instruments such as export processing zones (EPZs) and duty drawback 
schemes, and concludes that in theory both can bring about complete free trade. Cadot et al. 
(2000) consider the political economy implications of duty-drawback schemes for the 
incentives of export industries to lobby against upstream tariffs on imported intermediates. 
                                                 
2 Figure 1 illustrates these points by showing effective rates of protection (ERP) in China. These ERP are based on 
protection data in 1995 as presented in version 4 GTAP and are computed for import and export competing firms 
separately to emphasize differences in protection depending on the orientation of the firms. 
3 The ERPs for export processing firms with duty exemptions are close but not exactly zero because the domestic 
components of value added still have import duties embedded in them.     6
Acknowledging the importance of duty drawbacks for China’s export processing system, Fan 
and Li (2000) implement duty exemptions in a one-region recursive dynamic model of China.    
This paper presents an empirical multi-region general equilibrium model in which the 
effects of policy reform are differentiated based on the trade orientation of the firms. The 
resulting model could be used to analyze trade liberalization in the presence of duty drawbacks, 
assess whether countries should introduce or abolish these types of arrangements, and evaluate 
the economy-wide impact of improved administration of the duty drawback system. The 
method is similar to that of Fan and Li (2000), yet it differs in that it allows implementation of 
partial and/or full duty drawbacks in any number of regions in an empirical multi-region 
general equilibrium model. The model discussed here is designed so that in the absence of duty 
exemptions, its solution coincides with the solution of GTAP (Hertel 1997), a widely used 
applied general equilbrium model for trade policy analysis. This feature is attractive as it 
permits evaluation of various unilateral trade reforms, regional and multilateral trade 
agreements under different assumptions for duty drawbacks in different regions within the same 
modeling framework.  
The importance of duty exemptions for the analysis of China’s WTO accession is 
shown by conducting two experiments – one with GTAP, which ignores duty exemptions, and 
another one with the model featuring duty drawbacks. The comparison of the results from the 
two experiments suggests that findings of studies that have looked at China’s entry to the WTO 
without taking into account duty exemptions (Martin et al. 1999; Bach et al., 1996; Walmsley 
and Hertel, 2001) may be seriously biased. Failure to take into account duty exemptions on 
imports for production of exports in China will overstate the impact of China’s entry to the 
WTO on the country’s trade flows and welfare by 40 percent and 15 percent, respectively. The 
magnitude of the bias depends on the level of pre-intervention tariffs and the size of tariff cuts –    7
the larger the initial distortions and tariff reductions, the larger the bias when duty drawbacks 
are ignored. The bias in the estimates of China’s real GDP, trade flows and welfare changes due 
to WTO accession increases more than three times when China’s pre-intervention tariffs are 
raised from their 1997 levels to the much higher 1995 levels. These results suggest that trade 
liberalization studies focusing on economies, in which protection is high, import concessions 
play an important role and planned tariff cuts are deep, must treat duty drawbacks explicitly in 
order to avoid serious errors in their estimates of sectoral output, trade flows and welfare 
changes.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the general equilibrium model 
with duty drawbacks. Section 3 discusses data and parameters for this study. Section 4 
illustrates the importance of representing duty exemptions explicitly with an example of the 
impact of China’s WTO accession. Section 5 concludes with a summary of the findings. 
2. The model  
We consider a world with R regions each endowed with F types of endowments and producing 
G types of goods. There is a one-to-one correspondence between goods and industries. In each 
industry there are two types of competitive firms – export-oriented and domestic-oriented. All 
export-oriented firms are identical and form the export-oriented sub-sector of an industry. 
Similarly, domestic-oriented firms are identical and form the domestic-oriented sub-sector of an 
industry. Both types of firms produce the same commodity using the same technology and are 
identical in all respects except one – the export-oriented firms produce exclusively for export 
markets using imported intermediates that are either exempt from duties or eligible for refunds 
on the import tax paid, while the domestic-oriented firms produce no exports and supply    8
exclusively the domestic market. Production for domestic and export markets is therefore 
completely decoupled.  
The choice to fully separate domestic and export production simplifies considerably the 
representation of duty drawbacks in a large empirical multi-region model. It is preferable to 
representations based on a single sector producing differentiated products for domestic and 
export markets because it allows the two sectors to use quite different input mixes, and 
particularly for the export-oriented activities to use much more import-intensive means of 
production. It is also a fairly accurate depiction of the trade regime in countries where duty 
drawbacks are used as export promotion instruments while protection on the rest of the 
economy is fairly high.
4  
  One of the G industries produces a nontradable investment good, which could be 
installed in a domestic or an export-oriented firm. The model captures the fact that a portion of 
imported intermediate capital goods are duty exempt. This is an important feature since tax 
concessions for imported capital goods are popular in many developing countries. For example, 
capital goods brought into China for export processing by foreign-invested enterprises have 
been exempt from import duties during most of the 1990s. 
Export producers in region r supply  jr X of good j to export markets,
5 while domestic-
oriented producers supply  jr D  of good j to local markets. The intermediate input demand for 
input i in industry j of region r, Ω
ijr I , where superscript } , { X D ∈ Ω  indicates the type of sub-
sector (D stands for the domestic-oriented one, X stands for the export-oriented one), is 
                                                 
4 In a deterministic world, a producer of exports will always take advantage of duty exemptions or duty rebates 
unless the administrative costs of the export processing arrangements are excessive.  
5 The sector producing investment goods is an exception since its exports are zero.    9
proportional to the level of activity in sector j and determined by fixed intermediate input 
coefficients  ijr a :  
, jr ijr ijr a I Ω = Ω         ( 1 )  
where  }. ,..., 1 { }, ,..., 1 { , R r G j i ∈ ∈   
Firms purchase both foreign and domestic intermediates, which are imperfect 
substitutes in a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) composite function (Armington 1969). 
Producers for the domestic and export markets minimize unit intermediate input costs subject to 
input prices and the CES function that relates the level of activity to intermediate inputs:
6 
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where  } ,..., 1 { }, ,..., 1 { , R r G j i ∈ ∈ ;  Ω D
ijr I  is the demand of sub-sector  } , { X D ∈ Ω  of industry j 
for domestic intermediate i;
7 Ω M
ijr I  is the demand of sub-sector  } , { X D ∈ Ω  of industry j for 
imported intermediate good i; 
D
ir p  is the domestic price of good i in region r,  Ω M
ir p  is the 
import price of good i used for final consumption or as intermediate input by sub-sector 
} , { X D ∈ Ω in region r. Duty drawbacks for imported materials used in the production of exports 
imply that the intensity of imported intermediate use by the export sector is higher than the 
intensity of imported intermediate use by the sector producing for the local market. 
Zero profit for the choice of composite inputs imply that: 
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6 Functional forms are represented explicitly, but unit demand and supply functions are shown in reduced form, i.e. 
a(.), where superscripts  D I  and  M I stand for intermediate use of domestic and imported goods, respectively. 
7 The first superscript determines whether the intermediate inputs are domestic or imported. The second superscript 
defines whether they are used by the domestic-oriented sub-sector or the export-oriented sub-sector.    10
where  } ,..., 1 { }, ,..., 1 { , R r G j i ∈ ∈ ;  (.)
Ω I
j c  is the unit cost function defined by the CES 
aggregates of domestic and imported interemediate inputs for sub-sector  } , { X D ∈ Ω  of 
industry j; and 
Ω I
ijr p   is the composite demand price of good i for intermediate use by sub-
sector  } , { X D ∈ Ω of industry j in region r. 
Producers minimize unit factor costs given the vector of factor prices  F
fr p  and relevant 
taxes  F
fr t , and a CES function that relates the level of output to the factor inputs. Linear 
homogeneity of the production function implies that factor demands of sub-sector  } , { X D ∈ Ω  
in industry j of region r  ( Ω
fjr F ) can be written as: 





fjr jr fjr t p a F Ω Ω Ω =         ( 5 )  
where superscript F stands for factor use,   } ,..., 1 { }, ,..., 1 { }, ,..., 1 { R r G j F f ∈ ∈ ∈ . 
Imports of good i in region r for the production of goods sold domestically and for 
exports are CES composites of imports from various sources s,  Ω
isr M ,
8 where  } , { X D ∈ Ω , 
respectively. Consequently, bilateral imports, determined by cost-minimizing choice, given the 
fob export prices 
X
ir p , the export tax rate 
X
irs t , the import tariff rate 
M
irs t  and transport costs  irs τ , 
are given by:  
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where 
M
ir C is consumption of imported good i in region r,  } ,..., 1 { , }; ,..., 1 { , R r s G j i ∈ ∈ . 
                                                 
8 Subscript s stands for ‘source’ region, while subscript r stands for ‘destination’ region.    11
Output of the domestic-oriented sub-sector i in region r ( ir D ) meets demand for 






ijr ir C I D + = ∑ ∑
Ω
Ω
) (         ( 8 )  
where  } , { X D ∈ Ω ,  } ,..., 1 { }, ,..., 1 { , R r G j i ∈ ∈ . Output of the export sector meets import 
demand of all trading partners: 





irs ir M X        ( 9 )  
where  } , { X D ∈ Ω ,  } ,..., 1 { , }; ,..., 1 { R s r G i ∈ ∈ .  
Primary factor supply is exogenous and equals primary factor demand: 
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where  } , { X D ∈ Ω ,  } ,..., 1 { }; ,..., 1 { }; ,..., 1 { R r G j F f ∈ ∈ ∈ . 
  Competitive producers in both the export-oriented and domestic-oriented sub-sectors 
earn zero profit in equilibrium: 
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fir ir t p a t p a p                               (11) 
where  } , { X D ∈ Ω ,  } ,..., 1 { }, ,..., 1 { }, ,..., 1 { , R r F f G j i ∈ ∈ ∈ ; 
Ω I
jir t  is a tax on intermediate inputs. 
In equilibrium, the domestic cif  price equals the fob price gross of export tax, the applicable 
tariff, and transport costs: 
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where  } ,..., 1 { , }, ,..., 1 { R r s G i ∈ ∈ ,  φ  is a parameter between 0 and 1 that determines the 
extent of liberalization of the export processing sector.  
If φ  is zero, export producers get duty exemptions or full rebates of their import duty. 
If 0<φ <1, export producers get partial refunds. If φ =1 import taxes are the same for the export 
and domestic sub-sectors. Equations (4), (11) through (13) show that duty drawbacks improve 
the exporters’ competitiveness as their costs either do not reflect import duties or reflect 
reduced import taxes due to partial duty rebates.  
Equations (1) through (13) describe the changes needed in order to implement duty 
drawbacks in a standard multi-region applied general equilibrium model. For comparison 
purposes all other equations of the model come from the GTAP model (Hertel 1997) and for the 
sake of brevity are not shown here.
9 The model is implemented in GEMPACK (Harrison and 
Pearson 1996). When imported intermediate inputs used by exporting firms are taxed at the 
same rates as those used by firms selling locally, tariff cuts on imported intermediate inputs are 
the same regardless of their use, and the input composition of the export-oriented sub-sector is 
identical to the input composition of the domestic-oriented sub-sector, the solution with this 
model is identical to the solution with GTAP; otherwise the solutions differ.  
  
                                                 
9 A brief summary of these features follows. Consumers and the government receive income from payments for 
primary factor services and tax revenue, respectively, and save a fixed share of their income. Consumers maximize a 
constant-difference-elasticity (CDE) demand system, while public consumption is governed by a Cobb-Douglas 
utility function. As in the case of intermediate inputs,  both private and government final demands are a CES 
composite of domestic and imported products. The consumer price level is the numeraire, and aggregate investment 
is such that the trade balance is a fixed share of income.    13
3. The data   
The experiments assessing the importance of duty drawbacks for the analysis of China’s WTO 
accession employ version 5 GTAP database (Dimaranan and McDougall 2002), aggregated to 
20 regions (Table 1) and 25 sectors (Table 2). Some tax rates in China were changed using the 
approach in Malcolm (1998)
10 in order to reflect the following additional information: export 
subsidies for feedgrains and plant-based fibers at 32% and 10%, respectively, and nominal 
protection rates for agricultural commodities as suggested by Huang et al. (2002) (Table 4, 
column 2); the tax rate on unskilled nonagricultural labor at 34% as in Ianchovichina and 
Martin (2003) and based on information in Shi Xinzheng (2002), export taxes on textiles and 
apparel exports to the United States at 11% and 15%, respectively, and to the European Union 
at 12% and 15%, respectively.
11 
Since the GTAP data do not distinguish inputs based on whether they are used for 
export or domestic production, it was necessary to split the factor and intermediate input usage 
of each sector and region into domestic-oriented and export-oriented firms’ usage. For China, 
ideally, we would like to use information on duty exempt imports by product and sector use and 
factor usage by sector and sub-sector (for export or domestic use). This information is typically 
difficult to obtain.  China Customs, for instance, keeps track of imported intermediate input use 
by product, but not by sector. Initially the data on imported intermediate inputs in GTAP were 
split using information on duty-exempt imports by product in China at the HS2 level from 
China Customs. However, resulting data could not be employed in the analysis because they 
did not contain information on duty-exempt imports by sector use and the commodity classes at 
                                                 
10 This approach ensures that the adjustment are made while preserving the share information in the data base. 
11 The export tax equivalents were estimated and used by Ianchovichina and Martin (2003).    14
the level of aggregation for China Customs data often overlapped two or more GTAP 
categories. Moreover, the reported imports of duty-free intermediate inputs for export 
production from China Customs exceeded the total intermediate use obtained from China’s 
input-output tables in the GTAP data. 
 Several explanations come to mind, including data error, strong substitution toward the 
duty-free intermediates in the export processing sectors, and fraudulent misclassification of 
intermediates not destined for export processing.
12 As a result of these problems, the data set 
for the new model produced with this external information seriously distorted the original 
input-output and tax information in the GTAP data base.  
In order to get around this problem and the lack of data, the domestic and export sub-
sectors were initially created by dividing each sector’s intermediate and factor input use in 
proportion to the domestic and export shares of output in a region.
13 Since data sources suggest 
that nearly all imports purchased for production of capital goods in China were subject to duty 
exemptions,
14 we assume that the capital goods sector in China uses only duty exempt imported 
capital intensive manufactures. To preserve the tax information in the GTAP data, factor 
endowment, imported and domestic intermediate input use of the export and domestic-oriented 
sub-sectors at market prices are computed in the same way as the corresponding input use at 
                                                 
12 There is evidence that smuggling and various violations of the export processing regulations are 
common forms of fraud and account for approximately half of all trade related fraud. Estimates, based on 
data gathered by Naugton (2000) during interviews with Chinese officials in 1999, suggest that in the late 
nineties the value of all trade related fraud in a year was well over US$ 10 billion. Companies might 
under-invoice imports in order to use part of the undeclared materials to produce for the domestic market. 
Companies might over-invoice imports when they intend to either over-invoice exports, which is most 
common, or over-report the unit consumption of materials and use the over-invoiced portion to produce 
for the domestic market (Ianchovichina 2001). 
13 This method ensures that, for regions other than China, the treatments in GTAP and the new model are identical 
when tariffs and tariff reductions for imported intermediate inputs for export and domestic use are the same. 
14 According to GTAP 11 percent of total imports are used in the production of capital goods and according to the 
China Council (2001) 13 percent of imports are duty free imports used in the production of investment  goods.    15
agents’ prices. Imports of commodity i into region s used for production of exports and for 
domestic sales by source r were computed from the data on bilateral imports by commodity in 
GTAP as follows : 
irs is
X
irs M M γ = ,  
irs is
D
irs M M ) 1 ( γ − = ,  
where  } ,..., 1 { G i∈ ,  } ,..., 1 { , R s r ∈ , irs M  are bilateral imports of good i from region r into 











γ  , where  } ,..., 1 { G j∈ . 
This approach ensures that the sum of imported intermediates i by exporters in region s 
equals the sum of imported intermediates i from all regions r into region s. Similarly, the sum 
of imported intermediates i by domestic-oriented producers in region s and imports of good i 
for final consumption equals the sum of imports of good i used for domestic use from all 
regions r into region s.  
The next step was to eliminate tariffs on intermediate manufactured imports used in the 
production of exports in the newly created database using the approach in Malcolm (1998), 
modified so that all elasticities of subsitution except those between domestic and intermediate 
goods in China were set to 1. The elasticity of substitution between domestic and intermediate 
goods in China was set at twice its value in the GTAP database. This approach increased the 
import-intensity of the exporting sectors as tariffs on imports used for export processing were 
eliminated. It raised the share of imports used by the export activities in China to 30 percent 
(Table 7), while preserving key aggregate statistics of the GTAP database (Table 1; columns 3    16
and 4 of Table 2; last row of Table 3; Table 7). China’s sectoral shares in world output, exports 
and imports were changed somewhat, but in all cases these changes were negligible (Table 3).  
In the new data, import taxes on imports for domestic use were preserved and equal to 
the import tax rates on imports in version 5 GTAP database, while taxes on manufactured 
imports for the production of exports were set at zero (Table 4). Import taxes on farm products 
were left unchanged since evidence suggested limited use of duty exemptions for farm 
imports.
15 Protection on cross-border trade in services also do not differ based on the trade 
orientation of the firms. 
All parameters for the two experiments come from version 5 GTAP data (Dimaranan 
and McDougall 2002). These include the Allen partial elasticities of substitution that describe 
the substitutability between domestic and imported intermediates, the substitutability between 
imported intermediates from different sources, and the substitutability between primary factors. 
Furthermore, the Allen partial elasticities of substitution in the domestic-oriented sub-sector of 
a sector are the same as those in the export-oriented sub-sectors of the economy. This reflects 
the assumption that all firms are identical and facilitates the comparison between GTAP and the 
model with duty drawbacks.
16  
4. Analysis of China’s WTO Accession 
The importance of duty drawbacks for the analysis of policy reform is illustrated by evaluating 
the impact of China’s WTO accession first using the GTAP model, and then the model with 
                                                 
15 A number of farm products are still subject to state trading (World Trade Organization 2001). More 
recently, Huang et al. (2002) show that a number of products faced negative protection rates (Table 4). 
16 The assumption ensures that in the absence of duty exemptions and conditional on the assumptions 
listed above, the solution to the model with duty drawbacks coincides with the solution to the GTAP 
model.    17
duty drawbacks in section 2. The comparison of the results from the two models suggests that 
results of studies which have abstracted from China’s duty exemptions when analyzing China’s 
entry to the WTO (Martin et al. 1999; Bach et al. 1996; Walmsley and Hertel 2001) may be 
seriously biased. The presence of duty exemptions is an important determinant of the outcome 
of trade liberalization. With duty exemptions on imported inputs for export processing, the 
liberalization in China affects only intermediate imports for domestic use and imports for final 
consumption. Therefore, its impact on output, trade flows and welfare is smaller than the one, 
captured with GTAP which abstracts from duty exemptions. The impact is significantly smaller 
for those industries that rely heavily on imported intermediates.  
4.1  Experimental design 
The simulation design for the pair of experiments follows closely Ianchovichina and Martin 
(2003), but for simplicity and comparison purposes the changes associated with accession are 
evaluated in a comparative static context. Both experiments are designed to reflect the impact 
of WTO accession which involves (a)  liberalization from 1997 tariffs to post accession tariff 
rates (2007) (Table 4);
17 (b) the elimination of quotas on China’s textile and clothing exports to 
the US and EU markets;
 18 (c) the removal of agricultural export subsidies for feedgrains and 
plant-based fibers (cotton) in China (Huang et al. 2002); (d) the liberalization of China’s cross-
border trade in services; and (e) the restructuring of the Chinese automobile sector
19 (Francois 
and Spinanger 2002). The two experiments differ only in that tariff cuts in GTAP are the same 
                                                 
17 China’s own protection is reduced to the lesser of the tariff binding or the 2001 applied rate. The experiment 
features also tariff cuts as part of Chinese Taipe’s accession to the WTO.   
18 Quotas on textile and apparel exports have been represented in the analysis as if they were an export tax.  
19  The restructuring of the automobile sector is represented as a 20 percent productivity gain to car assembly 
operations.     18
for all imports regardless of their use, whereas tariff cuts on manufactured imports used by the 
export processing sector are zero in the model with duty exemptions (Table 4).    
The macroeconomic closure assumes full employment, perfect mobility of skilled and 
unskilled workers between sectors, and fixed trade balance as a share of GDP in China and 
Chinese Taipei.
20 Since accession to the WTO involves a long run change in the stance of trade 
policy the elasticity of substitution between imported goods from different sources and between 
composite imported and domestic goods in the GTAP data base were doubled.  
4.2 Results 
China’s output, export, and import changes due to WTO accession, obtained with GTAP and 
the model with duty drawbacks, are shown in Table 5. Columns 4, 7 and 10 of Table 5 show the 
bias introduced in the results when duty exemptions are not considered in the analysis. Both 
models lead to very similar estimates of world output change. The increase in China’s real GDP 
due to the country’s accession to the WTO is small reflecting the fact that both models do not 
include the linkage between trade reform and productivity growth.  
At the sectoral output level, however, China’s WTO accession boosts production in a 
number of sectors, including apparel, textiles, cotton and automobiles. Automobile 
manufacturing gets a boost as a result of the assumed increase in productivity of assembly-type 
operations and the tariff reductions on imported intermediate inputs such as auto parts. The 
expansion of the apparel industry is associated with the lifting of the burdens imposed by the 
MFA on China’s exports and domestic protection on the cost structure of the industry. This 
expansion in apparel in turn boosts China’s textiles and cotton sectors.  
                                                 
20 While the trade balance can be expected to vary, particularly if there is a substantial change in foreign investment 
levels, there is no link between the change in foreign investment and the chage in income in GTAP and the new 
model.     19
The results from the two models differ quantitatively. With GTAP accession to the 
WTO leads to an increase in China’s apparel output by 96 percent (column 5, Table 5), while 
with the model with duty drawbacks this increase is 81 percent. This implies that with GTAP 
the increase in China’s output of apparel is approximately 20 percent higher than the one 
predicted with the duty drawbacks model, which captures the expansion of apparel as a result of 
export quota removal while taking into account duty exemptions on imported inputs used in the 
production of apparel exports. These exemptions have essentially opened up the export-oriented 
apparel sector as they affected two-thirds of intermediate inputs in the apparel industry, and 
imply that the output increases are attributed mainly to the lifting of the burdens imposed by the 
MFA on China’s apparel exports.  
In some cases the results with the two models differ not only quantitatively, but also 
qualitatively. Given the large importance of export processing arrangements and duty 
exemptions in the electronics sector (Table 2) and the significant tariff cuts on electronic 
products (Table 4), the model with duty drawbacks suggests a small contraction in the output of 
electronics due to China’s WTO accession. By contrast GTAP misses the effect of duty 
exemptions on output and estimates a small export-driven increase in electronics output (Table 
5).    
The impact of WTO accession on China’s share in world trade is much stronger than 
the one on China’s share in world output (Table 5). According to GTAP, China’s exports and 
imports rise by 32 percent due to accession.
21 The model with duty drawbacks also estimates a 
strong, however, more modest increase in China’s exports and imports (23 percent) because it 
                                                 
21 The similar increase in imports and exports reflects the assumption that China’s trade balance is a fixed share of 
GDP.     20
allows for the partial liberalization implicit in the exemption scheme on intermediate inputs 
used in the production of exports.  
A comparison of the sectoral trade flow changes suggests that for some sectors – for 
example, electronics – the bias introduced by ignoring duty exemptions in China could be 
significant – a difference of 26 percent in the estimated percentage changes with the two 
models or an increase in exports with the duty drawbacks model that is 90 percent smaller than 
the one with GTAP. In the case of apparel, there is a 13 percent difference in the estimated 
percentage changes with the two models or an increase in exports with the new model which is 
45 percent smaller than the one with GTAP. For these sectors the export expansion with the 
model with duty drawbacks is strong, but much less so than with GTAP because duty 
exemptions have already removed much of the burden of protection on the export sector in 
China and any benefits of tariff cuts have a smaller, indirect impact. Failure to take into account 
duty exemptions on imported inputs used in the production of exports also leads to serious bias 
in the estimation of import changes for a number of products among which textiles (18 
percent), apparel (16 percent), automobiles (15 percent), light manufactures (16 percent) and 
other manufactures (11 percent) (Table 5).  
Table 6 shows regional welfare changes due to China’s entry to the WTO computed 
with GTAP (column 2) and the model with duty drawbacks (column 3). While qualitatively the 
changes in regional welfare are broadly the same, quantitatively the results differ substantially. 
Indeed, GTAP overestimates China’s welfare gain by almost 15 percent. This is due to an 
upward bias in the allocative efficiency gain most of which is due to gains in textiles (46 
percent), apparel (23 percent), electronics (13 percent) and other manufactures (11 percent) 
(last column of Table 6). The presence of a well functioning duty exemption scheme implies 
that to a large extent China’s liberalization has already been captured prior to accession, and    21
therefore the allocative efficiency gains associated with an improved allocation of resources 
across sectors due to WTO accession will be smaller than suggested by GTAP.  
For other regions, this implies that the change in their welfare will be mainly due to the 
removal of restrictions on Chinese exports and not so much to removal of China’s import 
tariffs. This, in turn, translates into smaller gains for developed countries and smaller loses for 
developing countries when duty exemptions are modeled explicitly. As a result the global 
welfare gain with GTAP is approximately 30 percent larger than the gain estimated with the 
model with duty drawbacks.  
4.3 Size of the bias and initial protection 
The degree of bias in estimating the changes due to trade reform with GTAP depends on the 
magnitude of the initial tariffs and tariff cuts – the larger the initial distortion and tariff 
reduction, the larger the bias when duty exemptions are ignored. The increase in the bias results 
from the fact that GTAP captures additional cost saving and efficiency gains associated with 
the rise in initial distortions and tariff cuts since it does not take into account duty exemptions 
for export processing.  
In China weighted average tariffs in 1997 were much lower than tariffs in 1995 (Table 
8). Consequently, the bias in the estimated impact of tariff reductions from 1995 to post 
accession tariff levels with GTAP would be much larger than the bias in the estimated impact 
of tariff cuts from 1997 to post accession tariffs.  Tables 9 and 10 show changes in output, 
trade, and welfare due to WTO accession, which involves liberalization from 1995 tariff levels. 
The experimental design is identical to the one presented in section 4.1 except for the tariff 
cuts, which are larger than the ones applied earlier since tariffs in 1995 were higher than tariffs 
in 1997 (Table 8). Results in Tables 9 and 10 suggest that the bias in GTAP’s estimates of    22
China’s real GDP, trade flows and welfare changes due to WTO accession increases more than 
3 times when China’s pre-intervention tariffs are raised from their 1997 levels to the much 
higher levels in 1995. For example, GTAP overestimates China’s welfare gain due to WTO 
accession from 1995 tariffs by 48 percent (Table 10), whereas the bias in the estimated gain due 
to WTO accession from 1997 tariffs is just 15 percent (Table 6). This increase in the bias in the 
estimated welfare gain is due to the fact that in the face of larger initial distortion and tariff cuts 
the GTAP model estimates a much larger (4 times) second best efficiency gain as it ignores the 
fact that the export sector benefits from duty exemptions on imported intermediate inputs.  
The bias in the sectoral results is also worse in the case of liberalization from 1995 
tariffs compared to liberalization from 1997 tariffs. It is largest for sectors in which 1995 tariffs 
are much larger than 1997 tariffs. The bias doubles in the case of electronics and triples in the 
case of apparel. It is 46 times larger in the case of automobile output and 15 times larger in the 
case of automobile exports and imports (Tables 5 and 9).      
5. Conclusions 
Concessional import rights, such as duty exemptions, which override existing protection, have 
been an important element of the process of gradual trade liberalization that has boosted growth 
in China and other countries. Despite their vast importance, duty drawbacks have been given 
relatively little attention in trade negotiations and multilateral trade liberalization studies. 
Standard global trade models have largely abstracted from the presence of concessional 
imports, while trade liberalization studies using these models have at best only acknowledged 
their importance and have not offered an in-depth solution to the problem.  
This paper presents a model with duty drawbacks in which the effects of policy reform 
are differentiated based on the trade orientation of the firms. The model treats explicitly both    23
duty drawbacks on imported intermediate inputs and investment goods used for the production 
of exports. The paper evaluates the importance of duty exemptions in China by assessing the 
impact of China’s WTO accession, which involves liberalization from 1997 to post-accession 
tariffs among a number of other liberalization measures, on the country’s output, trade and 
welfare. The analysis, which uses first GTAP and then the model with duty drawbacks, 
suggests that the absolute magnitudes of changes in sectoral output and trade flows due to 
accession are larger, sometimes substantially, with GTAP compared to those with the duty 
drawbacks model. The analysis shows that failure to account for duty exemptions in the case of 
China’s recent WTO accession will overstate the increase in China’s aggregate trade flows by 
40 percent and China’s welfare by 15 percent. This reflects the fact that duty exemptions have 
reduced substantially border protection in China prior to WTO accession. Consequently, any 
boost to trade and efficiency gains associated with an improved allocation of resources across 
sectors due to WTO accession will be smaller with the proposed model than with GTAP.  
The magnitude of the bias in estimating the changes due to trade reform with GTAP 
depends on the level of initial tariffs and the size of the tariff cuts – the larger the initial 
distortion and tariff reductions, the larger the bias when duty exemptions are ignored. The bias 
in GTAP’s estimates of China’s real GDP, trade flows and welfare changes due to WTO 
accession increases by more than three times when China’s pre-intervention tariffs are raised 
from their 1997 levels to the much higher 1995 levels. These results suggest that trade 
liberalization studies focusing on economies in which protection is high, import concessions 
play an important role, and planned tariff cuts are deep must always treat duty drawbacks 
explicitly in order to avoid serious errors in their estimates of sectoral, trade flow, and welfare 
changes.     24
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Figure 1. China’s Effective Rates of Protection in 1995. 
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Table 1. Key dimensions of version 5 GTAP data (in italics) and modified 






North America  0.68  0.18  0.15  0.14  0.15 
  0.68  0.18  0.15  0.14  0.15 
Western Europe  0.61  0.19  0.19  0.31  0.30 
  0.61 0.19 0.19  0.31  0.30 
Australia/New Zealand   0.62  0.22  0.17  0.20  0.20 
  0.62 0.22 0.17  0.20  0.20 
Japan 0.60  0.29  0.10  0.12  0.10 
  0.60 0.29 0.10  0.12  0.10 
China 0.48  0.36  0.12  0.30  0.27 
  0.48 0.36 0.12  0.30  0.27 
Taiwan  0.57 0.20 0.14  0.46  0.37 
  0.57 0.20 0.14  0.46  0.37 
Other NICs   0.57 0.38 0.11  0.52  0.58 
  0.57 0.38 0.11  0.52  0.58 
Indonesia  0.64 0.29 0.07  0.27  0.27 
  0.64 0.29 0.07  0.27  0.27 
Vietnam 0.71  0.33  0.10  0.43  0.57 
  0.71 0.33 0.10  0.43  0.56 
Other Southeast Asia   0.55 0.34 0.11  0.61  0.61 
  0.55 0.34 0.11  0.61  0.61 
India  0.65 0.24 0.12  0.12  0.12 
  0.65 0.24 0.12  0.12  0.12 
Other South Asia   0.76 0.19 0.09  0.17  0.21 
  0.76 0.19 0.09  0.17  0.21 
Brazil  0.64 0.20 0.18  0.08  0.10 
  0.64 0.20 0.18  0.08  0.10 
Other Latin America   0.75 0.21 0.08  0.19  0.22 
  0.75 0.21 0.08  0.19  0.22 
Turkey  0.67 0.26 0.12  0.23  0.28 
  0.67 0.26 0.12  0.23  0.28 
Other Middle East & N. Africa   0.57 0.22 0.22  0.33  0.33 
  0.57 0.22 0.22  0.33  0.33 
Economies in Transition   0.64 0.22 0.16  0.31  0.32 
  0.64 0.22 0.16  0.31  0.32 
S. African Customs Union  0.59 0.18 0.21  0.26  0.24 
  0.59 0.18 0.21  0.26  0.24 
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  0.76 0.16 0.12  0.27  0.31 
  0.76 0.16 0.12  0.27  0.31 
Rest of World   0.78 0.18 0.10  0.15  0.21 
  0.78 0.18 0.10  0.15  0.21 
Total  0.63 0.22 0.15  0.22  0.22 
  0.63 0.22 0.15  0.22  0.22 
Source: Author’s calculations based on version 5 GTAP data and modified GTAP data for the model with duty 
drawbacks.    28
Table 2. Distribution of Imported Intermediates Use by Sector in China (%) 
  Model with duty 
drawbacks 
GTAP  Model with duty 
drawbacks 
  Share in total import use 
of 














Rice  0.0 0.7  0.5  0.6 1  99 
Wheat  0.0 0.2  0.2  0.2 0 100 
Feedgrains 0.2  0.5  0.4  0.4  12  88 
Vegetables-fruits  0.1 1.8  1.3  1.4 2  98 
Oilseeds  0.0 0.1  0.1  0.1 5  95 
Sugar 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  12  88 
Plantfibers  0.0 0.7  0.5  0.5 0 100 
Livestock-meat  0.3 1.7  1.3  1.3 6  94 
Dairy  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 4  96 
Other food  0.7  1.6  1.3  1.4  17  83 
Beverages-tobacco 0.2 1.1  0.8  0.8 6  94 
Extract  0.6 3.0  2.3  2.4 8  92 
Textiles 6.5  7.5  7.2  7.1  27  73 
Apparel 7.3  1.7  3.4  2.5  65  35 
Light manufactures  5.1  1.0  2.2  1.7  69  31 
Petrochemicals  4.9 17.6  13.8  14.1 11  89 
Metals 2.4  7.5  6.0  6.1  12  88 
Autos  0.4 2.0  1.5  1.6 8  92 
Electronics 17.5  6.7  9.9  9.2  53  47 
Other  manufactures  15.3 18.4  17.5  16.9 26  74 
Trade-transport 2.4  6.4  5.2  5.2  14  86 
Construction  0.1 7.0  4.9  5.2 0 100 
Communication  0.1 0.7  0.5  0.5 3  97 
Commercial  services 0.2 2.5  1.8  1.9 3  97 
Other  services  0.2 8.5  6.0  6.4 1  99 
Capital goods   35.4  1.0  11.4  12.6  94  6 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  30  70 
Source: Author’s calculations based on version 5 GTAP data and modified GTAP data for the model with duty 
drawbacks. 
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Table 3. China’s Shares of World Output, Exports and Imports in 1997 (Percent) 
 Output  Exports  Imports 
 GTAP  Modelwith 
DD 
GTAP Model  with 
DD 
GTAP Model  with 
DD 
Rice  19.3  18.8  6.2 6.2 3.1 2.8 
Wheat  10.7 10.5  0.1 0.1 3.1 2.9 
Feedgrains  9.0  8.9 6.1 6.1 3.1 3.0 
Vegetables & fruits  17.7  17.3  2.9  2.9  1.3  1.2 
Oilseeds  8.5  8.4 1.8 1.8 8.3 7.9 
Sugar  1.1  1.1 1.3 1.3 2.0 1.9 
Plantfibers  15.0 14.4 0.0  0.0 13.2 12.3 
Livestock  &  meat 8.8  8.6 3.9 3.9 2.9 2.6 
Dairy  0.6  0.6 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.7 
Processed  food  3.4  3.4 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 
Beverages  &  tobacco  6.7  6.5 2.1 2.1 2.6 2.7 
Extract  8.5  8.4 1.5 1.5 2.1 2.0 
Textiles  15.7  14.9 10.8 10.6 10.6 11.4 
Apparel 9.7  9.6  18.7  18.7  1.5  1.6 
Light manufactures  18.7  18.2  27.6  27.4  3.4  3.8 
Petrochemicals  7.5  7.4 2.9 2.9 5.0 4.9 
Metals  6.9  6.8 3.3 3.3 4.4 4.2 
Automobiles  2.1  2.1 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.9 
Electronics  4.5  4.3 4.5 4.4 4.2 4.3 
Other  manufactures  6.4  6.3 4.2 4.2 3.9 3.7 
Trade & transport  2.3  2.2  3.3  3.3  2.7  2.5 
Construction  5.0  5.0 1.5 1.5 4.1 3.8 
Communications  2.4  2.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 
Commercial  Services  0.9  0.9 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.9 
Other  services  2.0  2.0 0.8 0.8 1.5 1.4 
Total  4.1  4.0 3.9 3.8 3.5 3.5 
Source: Author’s calculations with GTAP and the model with duty drawbacks (DD).   30
Table 4. Pre- and post-accession import protection (tariff or tariff equivalent) 
  China Chinese  Taipei 
  For domestic use  For export processing   






Rice -5.0 -3.3 -5.0 -3.3 2.2  0.0
Wheat 25.0 12.0 25.0 12.0 6.5  6.5
Feedgrains 20.0 32.0 20.0 32.0 1.0  0.0
Vegetables & fruits  -10.0 -4.0 -10.0 -4.0 35.7  16.0
Oilseeds 30.0 3.0 30.0 3.0 1.8  0.2
Sugar 44.0 20.0 44.0 20.0 21.9  22.7
Plantfibers 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 0.0  0.0
Livestock & meat  -20.0 -15.0 -20.0 -15.0 7.5  4.0
Dairy 30.0 11.0 30.0 11.0 16.6  5.9
Processed food  35.1 9.9 0.0 0.0 14.9  9.9
Beverages & tobacco  63.2 15.6 0.0 0.0 48.1  13.0
Extract 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.0 5.5  4.1
Textiles 25.1 8.9 0.0 0.0 6.1  5.6
Apparel 31.7 14.9 0.0 0.0 12.8  11.2
Light manufactures  12.1 8.4 0.0 0.0 4.0  3.4
Petrochemicals 13.1 7.1 0.0 0.0 4.2  2.9
Metals 9.7 5.7 0.0 0.0 4.0  1.5
Automobiles 34.4 13.8 0.0 0.0 23.9  13.3
Electronics 11.9 2.3 0.0 0.0 2.9  0.3
Other manufactures  13.0 6.6 0.0 0.0 4.4  2.1
Trade & transport  1.9 0.9 1.9 0.9 1.3  0.7
Construction 13.7 6.8 13.7 6.8 5.9  2.9
Communications 9.2 4.6 9.2 4.6 9.2  4.6
Commercial Services  29.4 14.7 29.4 14.7 3.7  1.9
Other services  24.5 12.7 24.5 12.7 7.1  3.5
Total – Agriculture  4.2 3.6 1.7 1.0 9.1  4.6
Total – Manufactures   15.0 6.9 0.0 0.0 6.3  3.5
Total merchandise trade*  14.4 6.8 0.0 0.0 6.5  3.6
Source: Version 5 GTAP for protection in 1997 and Ianchovichina and Martin (2003) for post-accession protection. 
*The estimates in the table are based on trade weights for the respective years. If trade weights for 2000 at the six-
digit level of the harmonized system are used the total weighted average tariffs in 2001 and 2007 are 12.2% and 
6.3%, respectively, for China, and 4.5% and 3.1%, respectively, for Chinese Taipei.     31
Table 5. Impact of Accession on Output, Exports and Imports (% changes) 
    Output     Exports    Imports   
 GTAP 
Model 
with DD Bias*  GTAP 
Model 
with DD Bias  GTAP 
Model 
with DD  Bias 
Rice -1.9  -1.6 -0.3 -7.5 -4.0 -3.6 -6.9  -8.7  2.0
Wheat -10.9  -9.9 -1.1 19.9 21.9 -1.6 29.1 28.9  0.2
Feedgrains -4.6  -4.7 0.1 -77.9 -77.6 -1.3 -15.7  -16.5  1.0
Vegetables & fruits  -3.9  -3.4 -0.5 1.9 3.0 -1.1 -20.5  -21.5  1.3
Oilseeds -15.1  -14.3 -0.9 26.0 27.8 -1.4 42.8  44.7  -1.3
Sugar -12.4  -11.0 -1.6 5.5 7.5 -1.9 38.8  37.8  0.7
Plantfibers 16.6  15.8 0.7 -55.5 -56.0 1.1 15.8  13.6  1.9
Livestock  &  meat  2.6 2.5 0.1 4.4 1.8 2.6 -26.2  -27.9 2.4
Dairy -8.1  -7.3 -0.9 7.3 6.3 0.9 65.3  64.2  0.7
Processed food  -17.6  -16.0 -1.9 13.8 12.8 0.9 116.5  106.0  5.1
Beverages & tobacco  -19.4  -17.5 -2.3 9.9 0.5 9.4 566.3  453.6  20.4
Extract -1.9  -1.5 -0.4 10.0 7.5 2.3 -8.0 -7.9 -0.1
Textiles  17.8 16.7 0.9 38.8 27.2 9.1 92.3 63.7 17.5
Apparel  96.2 81.2 8.3 213.6 177.3 13.1 154.7  120.4 15.6
Light manufactures  -0.2  0.0 -0.2 2.8 0.9 1.9 29.9  12.0  16.0
Petrochemicals -4.0  -3.4 -0.6 1.0 -0.6 1.6 17.2  13.2  3.5
Metals -6.4  -4.8 -1.7 -0.7 -0.4 -0.3 15.4 11.4  3.6
Automobiles 16.5  15.7 0.7 440.1 391.4 9.9 43.1  34.7  6.2
Electronics 5.0  -3.9 9.3 28.4 2.0 25.9 22.2  6.2  15.1
Other manufactures  -6.2  -4.2 -2.1 1.9 -1.4 3.3 27.0  14.2  11.2
Trade & transport  -0.3  -0.1 -0.2 -2.5 -2.1 -0.4 4.0  2.2  1.8
Construction  0.7 0.4 0.3 -3.5 -2.0 -1.5 22.2  19.4 2.3
Communications -1.1  -0.8 -0.3 -8.3 -6.7 -1.7 16.7 14.2  2.2
Commercial Services  -2.9  -2.5 -0.4 -9.3 -7.0 -2.5 41.3  38.6  1.9
Other services  -1.0  -0.8 -0.2 -4.4 -3.6 -0.8 40.5  37.6  2.1
Capital goods  1.1  0.7 0.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A  N/A
Total  2.3 1.8 0.5 32.4 22.8 7.8 32.3  22.5 8.0
Source: Author’s simulations with GTAP and the model with duty drawbacks (DD). 
* The bias is computed as a difference in percentage changes, namely [(1+x)/(1+x_DD)-1]*100, where x is the 
percentage change in the respective variable in GTAP and x_DD is the percentage change in the respective variable 
in the model with duty drawbacks. 
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Table 6. Welfare Changes due to China’s WTO Accession* ($US Millions) 
  GTAP  Model 
with DD 
North America  4384 3480 
Western Europe  7345 6009 
Contribution to the Difference 
between GTAP and model with DD: 
Allocative Efficiency Gains in China 
by Product: 
Australia and New Zealand  103 40    % 
Japan  2394 1513  Agriculture  0.1 
China  10317 8970  Processed  food  4.0 
Taiwán, China  592 337  Beverages  &  tobacco  0.1 
Other NICs  1249 734  Extract  -0.5 
Indonesia  -313 -286  Textiles  45.9 
Vietnam  -93 -83  Apparel  23.2 
Other Southeast Asia   -466 -411  Light  manufactures  1.0 
India  -716 -625  Petrochemicals  1.9 
Other South Asia   -808 -718  Metals  -1.6 
Brazil  1214 1068  Automobiles  3.8 
Other Latin America   -542 -516  Electronics  13.4 
Turkey  -281 -252  Other  manufactures  11.2 
Other Middle East & N. Africa   -371  -409  Trade & transport  -0.9 
Economies in Transition   -190 -239  Construction  0.4 
South African Customs Union   24 3  Communications  -0.1 
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  -84 -89  Commercial  Services  -1.5 
Rest of World   -178 -182  Other  services  -0.3 
Total  23580 18344  Total  100.0 
Source: Author’s simulations with GTAP and the model with duty drawbacks. 
*These are welfare changes due to reforms implemented between 1997 and 2007. 
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Table 7. Distribution of Imported Intermediates Use in China: A Comparison (%) 
    Model with Duty Drawbacks 
 
Share in total import use of all 











Rice 0.6 0.5 1 99
Wheat 0.2 0.2 0 100
Feedgrains 0.4 0.4 12 88
Vegetables-fruits 1.4 1.3 2 98
Oilseeds 0.1 0.1 5 95
Sugar 0.0 0.0 12 88
Plantfibers 0.5 0.5 0 100
Livestock-meat 1.3 1.3 6 94
Dairy 0.0 0.0 4 96
Other food  1.4 1.3 17 83
Beverages-tobacco 0.8 0.8 6 94
Extract 2.4 2.3 8 92
Textiles 7.1 7.2 27 73
Apparel 2.5 3.4 65 35
Light manufactures  1.7 2.2 69 31
Petrochemicals 14.1 13.8 11 89
Metals 6.1 6.0 12 88
Autos 1.6 1.5 8 92
Electronics 9.2 9.9 53 47
Other manufactures  16.9 17.5 26 74
Trade-transport 5.2 5.2 14 86
Construction 5.2 4.9 0 100
Communication 0.5 0.5 3 97
Commercial services  1.9 1.8 3 97
Other services  6.4 6.0 1 99
Capital goods   12.6 11.4 94 6
Total 100.0 100.0 30 70
Source: Author’s calculations based on version 5 GTAP and modified GTAP data for the model with duty 
drawbacks.    34
 Table 8. China’s import protection (tariff or tariff equivalent) 
  For domestic use
For export 












Rice  -5.0  -3.3 -5.0 -3.3  -5.0  -3.3 -5.0 -3.3 
Wheat  25.0  12.0 25.0 12.0  25.0 12.0 25.0 12.0 
Feedgrains  20.0  32.0 20.0 32.0  20.0 32.0 20.0 32.0 
Vegetables & fruits  -10.0  -4.0  -10.0  -4.0  -10.0 -4.0  -10.0  -4.0 
Oilseeds  30.0  3.0 30.0 3.0  30.0 3.0 30.0 3.0 
Sugar  44.0  20.0 44.0 20.0  44.0 20.0 44.0 20.0 
Plantfibers  20.0  20.0 20.0 20.0  20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 
Livestock  &  meat  -20.0  -15.0 -20.0 -15.0  -20.0 -15.0 -20.0 -15.0 
Dairy  30.0  11.0 30.0 11.0  30.0 11.0 30.0 11.0 
Processed  food  35.1  9.9 0.0 0.0  20.1 9.9 0.0 0.0 
Beverages & tobacco  63.2  15.6  0.0  0.0  137.2 15.6  0.0  0.0 
Extract  0.7  0.6 0.0 0.0  3.4  0.6 0.0 0.0 
Textiles  25.1  8.9 0.0 0.0  56.0 8.9 0.0 0.0 
Apparel 31.7  14.9  0.0  0.0  76.1 14.9  0.0  0.0 
Light  manufactures  12.1  8.4 0.0 0.0  32.3 8.4 0.0 0.0 
Petrochemicals  13.1  7.1 0.0 0.0  20.2 7.1 0.0 0.0 
Metals  9.7  5.7 0.0 0.0  17.4 5.7 0.0 0.0 
Automobiles 34.4  13.8  0.0  0.0  123.1 13.8  0.0  0.0 
Electronics  11.9  2.3 0.0 0.0  24.4 2.3 0.0 0.0 
Other  manufactures  13.0  6.6 0.0 0.0  22.0 6.6 0.0 0.0 
Trade & transport  1.9  0.9  1.9  0.9  1.9  0.9  1.9  0.9 
Construction  13.7  6.8 13.7 6.8  13.7 6.8 13.7 6.8 
Communications  9.2  4.6 9.2 4.6  9.2  4.6 9.2 4.6 
Commercial  Services  29.4  14.7 29.4 14.7  29.4 14.7 29.4 14.7 
Other  services  24.5  12.7 24.5 12.7  24.5 12.7 24.5 12.7 
Total – Agriculture  4.2  3.6  1.7  1.0  4.8  3.6  1.7  1.0 
Total – Manufactures   15.0  6.9  0.0  0.0  25.3 6.9  0.0  0.0 
Total merchandise trade*  14.4  6.8  0.0  0.0  24.3 6.8  0.0  0.0 
Source: versions 4 and 5 GTAP for protection in 1995 and 1997, respectively, and Ianchovichina and Martin (2003) for 
post-accession protection. 
*The estimates in the table are based on trade weights for the respective years.     35
Table 9. Impact of WTO Accession - Liberalization from 1995 Tariffs (% changes) 





DD Bias  GTAP 
Model with 
DD Bias 
Rice -3.1  -2.2  -0.9  -11.0  7.8  -17.4 -4.2  -13.2  10.4 
Wheat -8.5  -5.1  -3.6  6.6  22.3  -12.8 43.5  37.7  4.2 
Feedgrains -3.9  -3.3  -0.6  -79.3  -77.0  -10.0 -15.7  -18.8  3.8 
Vegetables & fruits  -5.1  -3.7  -1.5  0.2  12.0  -10.5 -23.0  -27.5  6.2 
Oilseeds -13.6  -10.2  -3.8  14.1  28.5  -11.2 58.3  61.1  -1.7 
Sugar -15  -9.7  -5.9  1.4  16.4  -12.9 41.5  36.2  3.9 
Plantfibers 7.3  8.8  -1.4  -46.7  -45.9  -1.5  5.3  1.6  3.6 
Livestock & meat  3  3.5  -0.5  -7.6  9.8  -15.8 -18.9  -28.1  12.8 
Dairy -6.9  -3.7  -3.3  -0.8 16.2  -14.6 77.1 67.8 5.5 
Processed food  -6.5  -1.8  -4.8  7.8  23.2  -12.5 33.7  23.6  8.2 
Beverages & tobacco  -65.7  -58.6  -17.1 36.3  21.2  12.5  2409.3  1425.3  64.5 
Extract -2.9  -0.9  -2.0  23.2 18.0 4.4  -2.5 -3.6 1.1 
Textiles  7.5  8.4  -0.8  92.9  49.4 29.1  231.5 99.1 66.5 
Apparel  142.4  91  26.9 378.0 242.6 39.5  804.1 478.1 56.4 
Light manufactures  4.8  6.1  -1.2  36.5  19.7  14.0  234.0  53.2  118.0
Petrochemicals -6.4  -3.7  -2.8  12.3 14.9  -2.3  35.5 22.9  10.3 
Metals -11.1  -5.2  -6.2  16.1  24.7 -6.9  44.7 27.2  13.8 
Automobiles 3.8  -21.4  32.1 1526.2 560.8  146.1 428.3  167.7  97.3 
Electronics  28.6  1.4 26.8 97.6  21.9 62.1  58.2  19.1 32.8 
Other manufactures  -8.7  -4.2  -4.7  22.6  20.6  1.7  59.2  36.7  16.5 
Trade & transport  0.6  1.6  -1.0  4.6  10.6  -5.4  1.9  -7.2  9.8 
Construction 2.3  1.7  0.6  3.9  16.9  -11.1 19.7  8.3  10.5 
Communications -0.9  -0.1  -0.8  -5.6 8.0  -12.6 15.1  3.1  11.6 
Commercial Services  -2.6  -1.3  -1.3  -8.6  7.4  -14.9 40.8  27.2  10.7 
Other services  -0.8  -0.3  -0.5  2.0 13.1  -9.8  37.1  23.0  11.5 
Capital goods  2.7  1.9  0.8  N/A N/A  N/A  N/A N/A  N/A 
Total  5.5  3.6  1.8  78.7  47.2 21.4  75.8  46.0 20.4 
Source: Author’s simulations with GTAP and the model with duty drawbacks (DD).    36
Table 10. Welfare Changes due to China’s WTO Accession* - Liberalization from 
1995 Tariffs  ($US Millions) 
  GTAP  Model with DD 
North America  7576 4488 
Western Europe  14506 9634 
Australia and New Zealand  386 109 
Japan  6550 3759 
China  27710 18891 
Taiwán, China  2529 1559 
Other NICs  5432 3197 
Indonesia  -503 -376 
Vietnam  -168 -114 
Other Southeast Asia   -792 -599 
India  -1057 -763 
Other South Asia   -1185 -841 
Brazil  94 -14 
Other Latin America   -520 -550 
Turkey  -416 -310 
Other Middle East & North Africa   -171 -462 
Economies in Transition   -16 -283 
South African Customs Union   90 10 
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  -39 -97 
Rest of World   -89 -133 
Total  59918 37104 
Source: Author’s simulations with GTAP and the model with DD. 
*These are welfare changes due to reforms implemented between 1995 and 2007. 